Derivation Policies
Typed rules for what CortexDB's enrichment may learn under a scope — staged through change sets, tested on real events, layered down the scope tree, with subject settings, templates and a sensitive-topic taxonomy.
Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Query Parameters
The scope resolved (422 INVALID_SCOPE_GRAMMAR when it does not parse).
texts adds texts: each named policy text present, with its content.
Value in
- "texts"
Header Parameters
operator_break_glass_v1 (API reference §8.15.3): read only on a request the operator key (CORTEX_API_KEY) authenticates, and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens; ignored on every other credential. reason=<incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other>; ticket=<1 to 64 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]>[; note=<percent-encoded UTF-8, at most 256 bytes>], exactly one header of at most 512 bytes; any other form is 400 INVALID_HEADER in every mode (details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason}), and the request's audit row a deny. Under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS=deny (the deployment's, or the tenant's own) an operator-key request that reads stored rows, a content-returning admin route, a private region's read, or an in-band path needs it, else 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED (details {mode, class, route}). A well-formed header is written to the audit row as {reason, ticket}, never the note.
length <= 512subject_token_shadow_v1: on a request the operator key authenticates, the token of the principal the operator acts for, verified by the same verifier (without waiting on the network and without the X-Cortex-Actor step) and evaluated in shadow by the access report (GET /v1/admin/access/report). It never changes the response: a repeated, oversized (over 8,192 bytes) or invalid header, or the operator key itself, is recorded as the shadow's invalid_token and the request runs as sent.
length <= 8192Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/v1/derivation/policy?scope=string"{ "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "policy_hash": "dp1:7a01ee39c4d2b18f05e6a9d3c7b14e20", "format_armed": 11, "derives": true, "ceiling": { "process_enrichment": "on", "enrichment_scope_allowed": true, "enrich": "on", "reference_root": false, "derives": true }, "mode": { "value": "explicit", "set_at": [ { "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "via": "settings" } ] }, "restrictions": [ { "rule": "topics.deny", "value": [ "credentials", "financial_account", "government_id", "payment_card" ], "set_at": [ { "scope": "org:acme/app:companion", "via": "path" } ] }, { "rule": "settings.deny_predicates", "value": [ "diet" ], "set_at": [ { "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "via": "settings" } ] } ], "steering": { "instructions": { "value": [ "ptx_0196f2a1c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6c" ], "set_at": "org:acme/app:companion", "via": "path", "texts": [ { "id": "ptx_0196f2a1c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6c", "bytes": 46 } ], "count": 1 }, "model": { "value": null, "effective": "claude-haiku-5-5" }, "entity_model": { "value": null, "effective": null }, "on_unlisted_predicate": { "value": "contest", "set_at": "org:acme/app:companion", "via": "path" } }, "custom_topics": [], "predicates": [], "ineffective": [], "versions": { "taxonomy": 1, "detectors": 1, "gate": 1 }}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Request Body
application/json
TypeScript Definitions
Use the request body type in TypeScript.
Response Body
application/json
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application/json
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application/json
application/json
curl -X POST "https://example.com/v1/derivation/policy/test" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "scope": "org:acme/app:companion", "policy": { "v": 1, "topics": { "deny": [ "gdpr_art9" ] }, "on_unlisted_predicate": "contest" }, "sample": { "recent": 50 }, "compare_with_active": true, "max_cost_usd": 1 }'{ "policy_hash": "dp1:9a14c0d29a7e3f5b6c8d0e1f2a3b4c5d", "active_policy_hash": "dp1:none", "events": [ { "event_id": "evt_0196f2a1c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6d", "outcome": "learned", "candidates": [ { "kind": "triple", "subject": "user", "predicate": "diet", "object": "vegetarian", "quote": "I'm vegetarian", "topic": "food", "verdict": "accepted", "rule": "accept.default", "active": "accepted", "active_rule": "accept.default" }, { "kind": "triple", "subject": "user", "predicate": "has_condition", "object": "asthma", "topic": "health", "verdict": "rejected", "rule": "topic.deny.health", "active": "accepted", "active_rule": "accept.default" } ] } ], "summary": { "events": 1, "accepted": 1, "held": 0, "rejected": { "topic.deny.health": 1 }, "unlabelled": 0 }, "diff": { "added": 0, "removed": 1, "changed_conflict_rule": 0 }, "cost": { "calls": 2, "input_tokens": 6100, "output_tokens": 900, "usd": 0.0039, "unpriced_calls": 0, "model": "claude-haiku-5-5" }}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Response Body
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/v1/derivation/templates"{ "templates": [ { "name": "consumer", "version": 1, "id": "consumer@1", "summary": "Protective defaults for consumer and companion apps", "body": { "v": 1, "from_template": "consumer@1", "mode": "automatic", "stages": [ "facts", "beliefs", "episodes" ] } } ]}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Response Body
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/v1/derivation/taxonomy"{ "version": 1, "categories": [ { "id": "health", "label": "Health", "description": "Physical, mental and reproductive health, stated or inferred", "groups": [ "gdpr_art9", "cpra_spi", "wa_consumer_health", "ny_art48_personal" ] } ], "groups": [ { "id": "gdpr_art9", "label": "GDPR Article 9 special categories", "categories": [ "health" ] } ], "detectors": { "version": 1, "packs": [ { "id": "payment_card", "detectors": [ "payment_card" ] } ], "detectors": [ { "id": "payment_card", "class": "checksum", "locales": [ "*" ] } ] }}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Request Body
application/json
TypeScript Definitions
Use the request body type in TypeScript.
derivation_policy_v1: PUT /v1/derivation/settings's body: the record's fields without v, by and at, consents without at.
Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X PUT "https://example.com/v1/derivation/settings" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "mode": "explicit", "deny_predicates": [ "diet" ], "consents": { "health": { "purpose": "health coaching" } } }'{ "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "settings": { "v": 1, "mode": "explicit", "deny_predicates": [ "diet" ], "consents": { "health": { "purpose": "health coaching", "at": "2026-11-07T10:00:00Z", "until": null } }, "by": "service:companion-app", "at": "2026-11-07T10:00:00Z" }, "policy_hash": "dp1:7a01ee39c4d2b18f05e6a9d3c7b14e20", "revision": 3, "consistency_token": "ct1:AAAAAQ"}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Query Parameters
The scope the settings are for.
Header Parameters
operator_break_glass_v1 (API reference §8.15.3): read only on a request the operator key (CORTEX_API_KEY) authenticates, and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens; ignored on every other credential. reason=<incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other>; ticket=<1 to 64 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]>[; note=<percent-encoded UTF-8, at most 256 bytes>], exactly one header of at most 512 bytes; any other form is 400 INVALID_HEADER in every mode (details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason}), and the request's audit row a deny. Under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS=deny (the deployment's, or the tenant's own) an operator-key request that reads stored rows, a content-returning admin route, a private region's read, or an in-band path needs it, else 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED (details {mode, class, route}). A well-formed header is written to the audit row as {reason, ticket}, never the note.
length <= 512subject_token_shadow_v1: on a request the operator key authenticates, the token of the principal the operator acts for, verified by the same verifier (without waiting on the network and without the X-Cortex-Actor step) and evaluated in shadow by the access report (GET /v1/admin/access/report). It never changes the response: a repeated, oversized (over 8,192 bytes) or invalid header, or the operator key itself, is recorded as the shadow's invalid_token and the request runs as sent.
length <= 8192Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/v1/derivation/settings?scope=string"{ "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "settings": { "v": 1, "mode": "explicit", "deny_predicates": [ "diet" ], "consents": { "health": { "purpose": "health coaching", "at": "2026-11-07T10:00:00Z", "until": null } }, "by": "service:companion-app", "at": "2026-11-07T10:00:00Z" }, "revision": 3}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Query Parameters
The scope the settings are for.
Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X DELETE "https://example.com/v1/derivation/settings?scope=string"{ "erased": true, "policy_hash": "dp1:4be1c0d29a7e3f5b6c8d0e1f2a3b4c5d", "consistency_token": "ct1:AAAAAQ"}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Query Parameters
The scope whose texts, and those of the scopes under it, are listed.
1 <= value <= 1000100A page's next_cursor.
Header Parameters
operator_break_glass_v1 (API reference §8.15.3): read only on a request the operator key (CORTEX_API_KEY) authenticates, and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens; ignored on every other credential. reason=<incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other>; ticket=<1 to 64 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]>[; note=<percent-encoded UTF-8, at most 256 bytes>], exactly one header of at most 512 bytes; any other form is 400 INVALID_HEADER in every mode (details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason}), and the request's audit row a deny. Under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS=deny (the deployment's, or the tenant's own) an operator-key request that reads stored rows, a content-returning admin route, a private region's read, or an in-band path needs it, else 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED (details {mode, class, route}). A well-formed header is written to the audit row as {reason, ticket}, never the note.
length <= 512subject_token_shadow_v1: on a request the operator key authenticates, the token of the principal the operator acts for, verified by the same verifier (without waiting on the network and without the X-Cortex-Actor step) and evaluated in shadow by the access report (GET /v1/admin/access/report). It never changes the response: a repeated, oversized (over 8,192 bytes) or invalid header, or the operator key itself, is recorded as the shadow's invalid_token and the request runs as sent.
length <= 8192Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/v1/derivation/texts?scope=string"{ "items": [ { "id": "ptx_0196f2a1c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6d", "role": "example", "scope": "org:acme/app:companion", "synthetic": false, "sources": [ "evt_0196f2a0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e01" ], "bytes": 212, "named_by": [ "org:acme/app:companion/attrs:derive" ], "at": "2026-11-07T10:00:00Z", "by": "user:alice" } ], "next_cursor": null}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Request Body
application/json
TypeScript Definitions
Use the request body type in TypeScript.
Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X POST "https://example.com/v1/derivation/texts/erase" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "scope": "org:acme", "ids": [ "ptx_0196f2a1c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6d" ], "reason": "example copied from a real conversation" }'{ "erased": 1, "policies_affected": [ "org:acme/app:companion/attrs:derive" ], "new_policy_hashes": [ "dp1:4be1c0d29a7e3f5b6c8d0e1f2a3b4c5d" ], "receipt_id": "ptxe_0196f2a1c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a70", "audit_id": "audit_0196f2a1c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a71"}A derivation policy is a set of typed rules for what CortexDB's background enrichment may learn
under a scope: which events it reads, which topics and sensitive values it never keeps, how a
field's values replace each other, who may set a field, what waits for review, which model it runs
and what it may spend. It is data, stored as a record at <scope>/attrs:derive, and it governs the
scope's whole subtree. For the concept and the guarantees, see Governed Memory.
Needs capability derivation_policy_v1; experimental. The policy read, the templates, the
taxonomy and the test work at any data format; staging a policy, subject settings and policy texts
need data format 11 (503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING on a server held at format 10).
Stage a policy
A policy changes only through a change set: stage, preview, activate. A change set that writes a derive record writes nothing else.
curl -sS -X POST "$CORTEX_URL/v1/access/changes" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEX_API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"id": "derive-companion-v1", "scope": "org:acme", "reason": "Consumer defaults for the companion app",
"parts": [{"part": 0, "records": [
{"path": "org:acme/app:companion/attrs:derive", "op": "put",
"record": {"tree": {"kind": "derive"},
"derive": {"v": 1, "from_template": "consumer@1", "mode": "automatic",
"topics": {"deny": ["payment_data", "government_ids", "secrets"],
"deny_unless_consent": ["gdpr_art9"], "on_unknown": "accept"},
"detectors": {"deny": ["payment_card", "iban", "government_id", "secret"],
"action": "drop", "source_action": "redact"},
"on_unlisted_predicate": "contest",
"instructions": [{"text": "Keep what helps the user plan meals and trips."}],
"examples": [
{"input": "I am vegetarian and I hate early flights.",
"memories": ["User is vegetarian", "User dislikes early flights"], "synthetic": true},
{"input": "lol ok whatever", "memories": [], "synthetic": true}]}}}]}]
}'The preview of a derivation change set has a derivation section: each record's rules before and
after, each governed scope's effective policy hash before and after with the rules that move, whether
the change only tightens (narrowing), the texts it names, and unsynced_impact, how many events and
facts were learned under the old policy and will read as unsynced once it activates (see
Re-derivation). The approval binds that section: if an
ancestor's policy, a subject's settings or a named text changes before activation, activation is
refused with 409 PREVIEW_CHANGED.
Who may stage one: an Owner of the governed scope or of the tenant root, with
derivation.administer.scope (or policy.administer.scope) there. derivation.administer.scope
governs learning only; it grants no access administration.
The policy body
The body is strict: an unknown key or a value out of range is 422 DERIVATION_POLICY_INVALID, with
the field named in details.field.
| Field | Values | Kind |
|---|---|---|
mode | off; explicit (only events labelled memory:remember or carrying a non-empty directives.extract); review (every candidate held for review); automatic | Restriction |
stages | A subset of facts, entities, beliefs, episodes, understanding; [] learns nothing | Restriction |
topics.deny, topics.deny_unless_consent | Taxonomy categories or groups, or your own topics' ids (at most 64 each) | Restriction |
topics.allow | null, or at most 64 ids: everything else is denied | Restriction |
topics.custom | Your own topics: {id, label, description} (at most 64) | Steering |
topics.on_unknown | accept, hold or drop, for a candidate with no topic label | Restriction |
detectors.deny | Detector ids or packs (at most 64) | Restriction |
detectors.action | drop, redact_value or hold, for a candidate a detector matches | Restriction |
detectors.source_action | send, redact (mask the matches before the model sees the text) or skip (no model call for the event) | Restriction |
detectors.apply_to_declared | Also refuse your own declared writes (typed triples, declared beliefs) a detector matches | Restriction |
sources.roles, sources.actors | Which messages are read: user, assistant, system, tool; person, agent, service | Restriction |
sources.exclude_labels, sources.exclude_intents | Events to leave out (at most 64 each) | Restriction |
sources.fenced_context | ignore (the default in every template) or allow: whether recall packs quoted back into a conversation are read | Restriction |
grounding.quotes | required (each memory must quote its source) or preferred | Restriction |
grounding.reject | Any of hypothetical, planned, joke, reported | Restriction |
predicates | Per field (at most 256): cardinality (single or multi), on_conflict (latest_wins, contest, keep_first), synonyms, and the writer rules writers and requires | Steering; writer rules are restrictions |
on_unlisted_predicate | contest, latest_wins, hold or drop, for a field the policy does not list | Steering |
entity_types | allow: null or a subset of the built-in entity types; strict: drop the others | Restriction |
review.hold | Hold candidates by topics, predicates, refused_writers (hold rather than drop what a writer rule refuses), confidence_below (0 to 1) | Restriction |
review.lapse_days | 1 to 90 (default 30): an undecided candidate lapses | Restriction |
review.reviewers | Principals or sets who may decide; empty means the scope's Writers | Steering |
episodes | session_gap (1 minute to 7 days), group_by_label, builder (on, or off when your own worker declares episodes) | Steering |
compartment | open or sealed: summaries across scopes never blend a sealed subtree with its siblings | Restriction |
model, entity_model | null (the server's own model) or a model the operator allows | Steering |
output_language | source, or a language tag | Steering |
budget_usd_per_day | 0 to 1,000 US dollars a UTC day for extraction under the policy | Restriction |
instructions, examples | Up to 8 instructions and 32 examples (see Policy texts) | Steering |
use | Read-time use rules | Restriction |
How policies combine
A scope's effective policy comes from the derive records along its path and its org chart, and from subject settings:
- Restrictions accumulate. Deny lists are joined, allow lists intersected, the strictest value wins, budgets and lapse days take the smallest. A rule set on an org-chart parent still binds: a person's scope under a team cannot escape an application's denial.
- Steering is nearest-wins. Instructions, examples, models, output language, episodes, reviewers, and each field's cardinality and conflict rule come from the nearest scope that sets them.
- A child cannot widen an ancestor. Staging a looser rule (an
allownaming what an ancestor denies, a loosermode, a higher budget) is refused with422 DERIVATION_POLICY_WIDENS, naming the rule and the ancestor. - The server's own settings come first. With enrichment off, a scope outside the enrichment
allowlist, an effective
enrich: offor a reference root, nothing is learned whatever a policy says. - No policy anywhere is the empty policy,
dp1:none: enrichment derives every stage.
GET /v1/derivation/policy?scope=… answers the effective policy: each restriction with every scope
that sets it (set_at), each steering field with the one scope that set it, the values set on the
path that have no effect there and why (ineffective), and the policy's hash (dp1: and 32 hex
digits). Every fact learned under a policy is stamped with that hash. include=texts adds the
instructions' and examples' text, for an Owner with derivation.administer.scope.
Templates and the taxonomy
GET /v1/derivation/templates serves ready-made policies:
| Template | For |
|---|---|
consumer@1 | Protective defaults for consumer and companion apps |
minimal@1 | Remember only what the user asks |
enterprise@1 | Work memory over chat, tickets and documents |
minor@1 | Apps used by minors; carries the read-time use rule |
health_app@1 | Health apps |
Applying a template copies its body into your record (from_template only names where it came from),
so upgrading CortexDB never changes a stored policy.
GET /v1/derivation/taxonomy serves the sensitive-topic taxonomy: 20 categories (health,
sex_life_orientation, gender_identity, religion_belief, political_opinion, union_membership,
racial_ethnic_origin, genetic, biometric, neural, precise_geolocation, government_id,
financial_account, payment_card, credentials, criminal_record, immigration_status,
communications_content, minor_status, personal_matters), the groups that name them (gdpr_art9,
cpra_spi, wa_consumer_health, ny_art48_personal, government_ids, payment_data, secrets), and
the detector catalogue with each detector's precision and locales.
Topic labels are a model's judgment
A candidate's topic is labelled by the extraction model, so a denied topic can leak when the model labels a candidate otherwise. Detectors and the structural rules (stages, sources, grounding, writer rules) are exact. Test a topic policy on your own events before you rely on it.
Test a draft
POST /v1/derivation/policy/test runs extraction and the policy over up to 200 of your events under a
draft, and answers each candidate's verdict and rule, beside the active policy's. It writes
nothing.
curl -sS -X POST "$CORTEX_URL/v1/derivation/policy/test" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEX_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"scope": "org:acme/app:companion",
"policy": {"v": 1, "topics": {"deny": ["gdpr_art9"]}, "on_unlisted_predicate": "contest"},
"sample": {"recent": 50}, "compare_with_active": true, "max_cost_usd": 1.00}'{"policy_hash": "dp1:9a14c0d29a7e3f5b6c8d0e1f2a3b4c5d", "active_policy_hash": "dp1:none",
"events": [{"event_id": "evt_0196…", "outcome": "learned", "candidates": [
{"kind": "triple", "subject": "user", "predicate": "diet", "object": "vegetarian",
"topic": "food", "verdict": "accepted", "rule": "accept.default", "active": "accepted"},
{"kind": "triple", "subject": "user", "predicate": "has_condition", "object": "asthma",
"topic": "health", "verdict": "rejected", "rule": "topic.deny.health", "active": "accepted"}]}],
"summary": {"events": 50, "accepted": 61, "held": 0,
"rejected": {"topic.deny.health": 4, "detector.payment_card": 1}, "unlabelled": 3},
"diff": {"added": 0, "removed": 5, "changed_conflict_rule": 2},
"cost": {"calls": 12, "usd": 0.31, "model": "claude-haiku-5-5"}}- The draft is a policy body (
policy), which takes the place of the scope's own record while every ancestor's restrictions still apply, orchangeset: {id, scope}, your own staged change set. - The sample is
sample.recent(1 to 200 of the newest events you can read) orsample.event_ids(at most 200). - Rejected candidates are shown with their text. The answer goes only to a caller who can read the
sample events, and nothing of it is stored or logged.
unlabelledcounts candidates with no topic label. - Cost.
max_cost_usd(default 1) caps the run and is reserved from the tenant's daily budget for tests and dry runs (CORTEX_DERIVATION_BUDGET_USD, 5 US dollars by default). Events past the cap answernot_run. A model the price book cannot price is refused.
It needs an Owner with derivation.administer.scope and llm.invoke, and a server with enrichment
on (409 ENRICHMENT_OFF otherwise).
Writer rules
A field's writers say who may set it: extraction, triple (a typed triple you write),
declared_belief, correction (a correction's replacement), review (an approved review decision),
derived_by:<name> (a write-back stamped with that name), app:service:<id>, or source:<label> (a
write that is, or cites, an event labelled source:<label>). requires adds a condition every write
must meet.
"predicates": {"level": {"cardinality": "single", "on_conflict": "latest_wins",
"writers": ["triple"], "requires": {"label": "source:assessment"}}}Here only a typed triple that is, or cites, an assessment may set level. A declared write that
breaks a writer rule is refused with 409 WRITER_NOT_ALLOWED and nothing is stored (in a bulk write,
only that item fails). An extracted candidate that breaks one is rejected, or held for review with
review.hold.refused_writers.
Subject settings
PUT /v1/derivation/settings lets an application, or its end user, tighten learning for one scope at
once, with no change set: settings only restrict and consent, so they need no preview.
curl -sS -X PUT "$CORTEX_URL/v1/derivation/settings" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEX_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "mode": "explicit", "deny_predicates": ["diet"],
"consents": {"health": {"purpose": "health coaching"}}}'| Field | Effect |
|---|---|
mode | off, explicit, review or automatic, only stricter than the effective policy (422 DERIVATION_POLICY_WIDENS otherwise) |
deny_topics, deny_predicates | Topics and fields never learned about this subject (at most 64 each) |
consents | By topic, {purpose, until?}: lifts a deny_unless_consent topic while it lasts, never a plain denial |
limit_spi | Denies every category of California's sensitive personal information (cpra_spi) |
objection | The subject's mode becomes explicit |
attributes | age_assured_adult, age_assured_at, minor: what the application asserts for the read-time use rule |
PUT replaces the whole record, so read it, change it and write it back. GET reads it; DELETE
erases it. Giving, changing or withdrawing a consent writes an audit row (derivation_consent) that
holds a hash of the consents before and after, never the consents themselves. A Writer of the scope
may write settings, so an end user's own token can.
Policy texts
Instructions, examples and your own topics' descriptions can hold personal data, so each is stored as
its own erasable record, a policy text (ptx_…), not inside the policy. Send them inline in the
change set; the staging gives each an id. Editing one makes a new text, so the policy's hash moves.
- An example must say it is
synthetic(no personal data) or cite, insources, the 1 to 64 events it was copied from. Erasing any of those events erases the example. GET /v1/derivation/texts?scope=…lists the texts created at or under a scope, without content.POST /v1/derivation/texts/eraseerases texts by id and answers with a receipt and each affected policy's new hash. Thereasonyou give is kept nowhere: only its hash is in the audit row.- A text no active policy or open change set has named for 30 days is erased.
Limits: an instruction up to 4 KiB (8 per policy); an example's input up to 4 KiB with 0 to 16
memories of up to 512 bytes (32 per policy; memories: [] is a negative example).
Read-time use rules
A policy's use field limits how memory is used at read time, not what is stored. New York's
General Business Law Article 48 asks the apps it covers not to use information a user gave more than
twelve hours earlier, or in an earlier session, unless the operator has established that the user is
not a minor. The minor@1 template carries this rule; no other template does.
"use": {"rules": [{"id": "ny_unassured_window", "unless": "age_assured_adult",
"withhold": {"captured_before": "12h", "other_sessions": true}, "content": "all"}]}- Where it is in force: at the scope and below, unless the subject's settings assert
attributes.age_assured_adult: true. A subject asserted to be aminoris never exempt. The application makes the assertion; CortexDB verifies no age and stores no age-assurance evidence. - What is withheld: events captured before the window or in another session than the read's, and
everything derived only from such events. An event's session is its source locator's session id,
else its
session:<id>label. - Where:
POST /v1/recall(and its stream),POST /v1/answer,POST /v1/composeand the/mcprecalltool take asessionfield. A read without one counts every event as another session's. A server without that capability refusessessionon recall (422 INVALID_BODY) and ignores it on answer and compose, so send it only to a server whoseGET /v1/admin/versionlistsderivation_use_rules_v1. - Where not: the subject's own access reads are never filtered:
GET /v1/events,/v1/facts,/v1/beliefs,/v1/episodes,GET /v1/memory/aboutand the export. - What a read says:
use_rule_withheld: <n> events from earlier sessionsin itswarnings.
The rule judges nothing with a model and deletes nothing; retention and erasure do that. Only
content: "all" is supported.
Models and budgets
| Setting | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
CORTEX_DERIVATION_MODELS | the server's enrichment model | The models a policy's model and entity_model may name; another is refused at staging (422 DERIVATION_MODEL_NOT_ALLOWED) |
CORTEX_DERIVATION_BUDGET_USD | 5 | US dollars a tenant's policy tests and re-extraction dry runs may spend a UTC day |
CORTEX_DERIVATION_BUDGET_MAX_USD | 500 | The most a re-extraction job may be approved to spend |
CORTEX_DERIVATION_REEXTRACT | tenant | Who may run a re-extraction: tenant (an Owner), operator or off |
A policy's budget_usd_per_day holds ongoing extraction under it: once a day's budget is spent, its
events wait for the next UTC midnight (their decision reads skipped, reason budget). Every call is
priced from the price book; a call to a model with no price spends the whole day's budget, so declare
its rate in CORTEX_MODEL_PRICES.
Errors
| HTTP | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 422 | DERIVATION_POLICY_INVALID | A body field is unknown, out of range, or names an unknown topic, detector or text (details.field, details.reason) |
| 422 | DERIVATION_POLICY_WIDENS | A rule looser than an ancestor's, or than the subject's settings (details.rule, details.ancestor) |
| 422 | DERIVATION_MODEL_NOT_ALLOWED | A model the operator does not allow (details.allowed) |
| 422 | DERIVATION_TEXT_INVALID | An inline text that is too large, too many, or an example with neither synthetic nor sources |
| 422 | POLICY_TEST_TOO_LARGE | A test past 200 events, past its cap, or past the tenant's day |
| 409 | WRITER_NOT_ALLOWED | A declared write a writer rule refuses (details.predicate, details.writers) |
| 409 | ENRICHMENT_OFF | A test on a server with enrichment off |
| 503 | FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING | The server is held at data format 10 |
See also: Errors, Change Sets, Re-derivation.
Derivation status
How far behind a scope's async derived layers are — a catch-up probe for extraction, episodes, beliefs and concepts — and what became of one event.
Corrections
Reject, replace, pin or confirm a memory CortexDB learned, and undo it — corrections that stay applied through re-enrichment, rebuilds, failovers and scope moves.