Corrections
Reject, replace, pin or confirm a memory CortexDB learned, and undo it — corrections that stay applied through re-enrichment, rebuilds, failovers and scope moves.
Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Header Parameters
operator_break_glass_v1 (API reference §8.15.3): read only on a request the operator key (CORTEX_API_KEY) authenticates, and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens; ignored on every other credential. reason=<incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other>; ticket=<1 to 64 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]>[; note=<percent-encoded UTF-8, at most 256 bytes>], exactly one header of at most 512 bytes; any other form is 400 INVALID_HEADER in every mode (details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason}), and the request's audit row a deny. Under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS=deny (the deployment's, or the tenant's own) an operator-key request that reads stored rows, a content-returning admin route, a private region's read, or an in-band path needs it, else 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED (details {mode, class, route}). A well-formed header is written to the audit row as {reason, ticket}, never the note.
length <= 512subject_token_shadow_v1: on a request the operator key authenticates, the token of the principal the operator acts for, verified by the same verifier (without waiting on the network and without the X-Cortex-Actor step) and evaluated in shadow by the access report (GET /v1/admin/access/report). It never changes the response: a repeated, oversized (over 8,192 bytes) or invalid header, or the operator key itself, is recorded as the shadow's invalid_token and the request runs as sent.
length <= 8192Request Body
application/json
TypeScript Definitions
Use the request body type in TypeScript.
Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X POST "https://example.com/v1/corrections" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "idempotency_key": "bob-fix-18", "action": "replace", "target": { "claim": { "subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Boston" } }, "value": { "object": "Denver", "valid_from": "2026-03-01" } }'{ "correction_id": "cor_0196f3b0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e02", "action": "replace", "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "claim": { "subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Boston" }, "replacement": { "event_id": "evt_0196f3b0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e03", "claim": { "subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Denver" } }, "state": "active", "replayed": true, "record_kept": true, "consistency_token": "ct1.eyJyIjoib3JnOmFjbWUifQ"}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Query Parameters
The scope the correction governs (422 INVALID_SCOPE_GRAMMAR when it does not parse); its root routes the request on a cluster.
Value in
- "reject"
- "replace"
- "pin"
- "confirm"
Value in
- "user"
- "review"
- "regate"
- "conflict"
- "import"
1 <= value <= 200Header Parameters
operator_break_glass_v1 (API reference §8.15.3): read only on a request the operator key (CORTEX_API_KEY) authenticates, and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens; ignored on every other credential. reason=<incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other>; ticket=<1 to 64 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]>[; note=<percent-encoded UTF-8, at most 256 bytes>], exactly one header of at most 512 bytes; any other form is 400 INVALID_HEADER in every mode (details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason}), and the request's audit row a deny. Under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS=deny (the deployment's, or the tenant's own) an operator-key request that reads stored rows, a content-returning admin route, a private region's read, or an in-band path needs it, else 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED (details {mode, class, route}). A well-formed header is written to the audit row as {reason, ticket}, never the note.
length <= 512subject_token_shadow_v1: on a request the operator key authenticates, the token of the principal the operator acts for, verified by the same verifier (without waiting on the network and without the X-Cortex-Actor step) and evaluated in shadow by the access report (GET /v1/admin/access/report). It never changes the response: a repeated, oversized (over 8,192 bytes) or invalid header, or the operator key itself, is recorded as the shadow's invalid_token and the request runs as sent.
length <= 8192Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/v1/corrections?scope=string"{ "items": [ { "correction_id": "cor_0196f3b0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e01", "action": "reject", "bind": "claim", "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "claim": { "subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Boston" }, "origin": "user", "by": "user:bob", "at": "2026-11-07T10:02:11Z", "reason": "I never lived in Boston", "sources": 3, "sources_remaining": 3, "state": "active" } ], "next_cursor": null, "has_more": false}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Path Parameters
The correction, cor_; any other value answers 404 NOT_FOUND.
^cor_[0-9a-f]{32}$Query Parameters
The scope the correction governs (422 INVALID_SCOPE_GRAMMAR when it does not parse); its root routes the request on a cluster.
Header Parameters
operator_break_glass_v1 (API reference §8.15.3): read only on a request the operator key (CORTEX_API_KEY) authenticates, and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens; ignored on every other credential. reason=<incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other>; ticket=<1 to 64 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]>[; note=<percent-encoded UTF-8, at most 256 bytes>], exactly one header of at most 512 bytes; any other form is 400 INVALID_HEADER in every mode (details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason}), and the request's audit row a deny. Under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS=deny (the deployment's, or the tenant's own) an operator-key request that reads stored rows, a content-returning admin route, a private region's read, or an in-band path needs it, else 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED (details {mode, class, route}). A well-formed header is written to the audit row as {reason, ticket}, never the note.
length <= 512subject_token_shadow_v1: on a request the operator key authenticates, the token of the principal the operator acts for, verified by the same verifier (without waiting on the network and without the X-Cortex-Actor step) and evaluated in shadow by the access report (GET /v1/admin/access/report). It never changes the response: a repeated, oversized (over 8,192 bytes) or invalid header, or the operator key itself, is recorded as the shadow's invalid_token and the request runs as sent.
length <= 8192Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/v1/corrections/string?scope=string"{ "correction_id": "cor_0196f3b0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e01", "action": "reject", "bind": "claim", "scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "claim": { "subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Boston" }, "origin": "user", "by": "user:bob", "at": "2026-11-07T10:02:11Z", "reason": "I never lived in Boston", "sources": 3, "sources_remaining": 3, "state": "active"}Authorization
bearer Authorization: Bearer . Four credentials authenticate: (1) the operator key, the static CORTEX_API_KEY: the trusted operator, acting as the principal X-Cortex-Actor names (default user:local), in billing tenant default; (2) a PASETO v4 public token this server's minter signed (POST /v1/auth/tokens, POST /v1/auth/signup, the mint_offline tool), of audience CORTEX_V1_AUDIENCE or, with CORTEX_V1_TENANT_AUDIENCES=1, a billing tenant's own cortexdb:tenant:; (3) since 0.14.0 (principal_chain_v1), a JWT (RS256 or ES256) or PASETO v4 public token of an issuers-file entry (CORTEX_AUTH_ISSUERS_FILE; [auth] issuers_file on a cluster data node), whose subject, audience and token id (:) the entry maps; (4) a commitment transport token, on /v1/memory/commitments/* only. HS256, none and every symmetric JWT algorithm are refused. With auth disabled (no operator key: CORTEX_API_KEY unset on a loopback bind, or CORTEX_INSECURE_NO_AUTH) no token is verified and every request is served as the trusted operator, as the X-Cortex-Actor it names or user:local. On the operator key, with auth disabled and in the unsigned development mode, an X-Cortex-Actor that is not a principal id is 400 INVALID_HEADER, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Actor, reason: the parse error} (since 0.14.0; before, 401 INVALID_BODY). X-Cortex-Actor must equal the token's sub; a token of an issuers-file entry in prefix, hash or directory mode and a call of /mcp may leave it out (when present it must match). Any other token sent without it is verified first: a bearer of no known token form (a mistyped operator key) is 401 MISSING_TOKEN, any other bad token gets its own refusal, as with the header, and only a token that verifies answers 401 ACTOR_MISMATCH, the header is required. Every authenticated response carries X-Cortex-Token-Expires-In and X-Cortex-Token-Expires-At (and a Warning header within 72 h of expiry); every error of the auth layer carries X-Cortex-Request-ID.
Authentication refusals, the same on every authenticated route, none retriable unless marked. A token that carries none of the principal-chain claims and was not signed by an issuers-file entry gets each code with no details, as in 0.13.x; an entry's token, and a token that carries a chain claim other than minter, gets details.issuer (the entry's id, minter, commitment or unknown) and the details named here. 401 MISSING_TOKEN: no Authorization: Bearer header, or a bearer that is neither the operator key nor a PASETO v4 public or JWT token (a wrong operator key), with or without X-Cortex-Actor. 401 INVALID_TOKEN: a PASETO token no registered key verifies, a token signed by a key other than the issuer its iss names included. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNATURE: a bad signature, an iss no issuer is registered under, a JWT algorithm other than RS256 or ES256, a malformed token, or, on a token without chain claims, an iat ahead of the clock; for an issuers-file entry's token details.reason issuer_disabled, token_type, critical_header, algorithm, kid_revoked or unknown_kid (none for a bad signature). 401 EXPIRED_TOKEN. 401 REVOKED_TOKEN: the token's id is revoked (an entry's token goes by :). 401 WRONG_TENANT: an aud the token's issuer may not name, or one that names no tenant. 401 INVALID_TOKEN_CLAIM (since 0.14.0), details.claim and details.reason: a principal-chain claim malformed (malformed, not_an_agent, same_as_sub, not_a_service, person_with_agent, run_start_without_run, after_iat, run_too_old, out_of_range; unknown_critical_claim, with details.critical); an issuers-file entry's token without exp, iat or jti (missing), with iat or nbf ahead of the clock (ahead), or living longer than the entry's max_lifetime_s (claim exp, lifetime_over_maximum, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s); a token this server's minter signed whose exp - iat is above the ceiling for its subject as this server runs it (CORTEX_MINT_MAX_LIFETIME_PERSON, _AGENT and _SERVICE since 0.14.1; by default 7,776,000 s for a user:, 604,800 s for an agent:, 2,592,000 s for a service: or system:) (claim exp, lifetime_over_ceiling, details.issuer minter, details.lifetime_s, details.ceiling_s; checked before the revocation, and counted instead while CORTEX_MINT_LIFETIME_ENFORCE=off); and, whatever issuer signed it, a token whose act names an AI employee of its tenant, the self of an employee record that is not delegable (claim act, act_not_delegable). 401 CLAIM_NOT_PERMITTED (since 0.14.0), details.claim: a chain claim the token's issuer is not bound to assert (an issuers-file entry's [issuer.claims]; minter from any issuer but this server's minter; the minter's own chain claims without the chain assertion), or an issuers-file entry's scopes entry outside its token's tenant root org: (claim scopes, details.entry). 401 SUBJECT_UNMAPPED (since 0.14.0), details.reason: an issuers-file entry's subject mapping produced no principal (missing, not_a_principal, kind, service, foreign_namespace, personal_data_in_id, malformed, too_long, not_in_directory, directory_not_here); and, on every route whatever issuer signed the credential, a principal whose entry in its tenant's directory (org:) is deactivated (deactivated; never the trusted operator). 410 TENANT_DELETED (since 0.14.0): the credential's tenant root, org:, is being deleted or was (POST /v1/erasures/tenant); never the trusted operator. 503 REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the revocation list cannot answer, so every token is refused as an outage, never 401 REVOKED_TOKEN, and the list still fails closed: on a cluster data node while the node's revocation lease has expired (the metadata group has not confirmed its revocation set for 10 s, or the node has just started), and on a single node once the list's journal failed (a refused write latches the list). 503 ISSUER_KEYS_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): an issuers-file entry's JWKS cannot be fetched and no pinned or cached key verifies the token; Retry-After is the whole seconds until the key cache's next fetch (its backoff, 3 s doubling to 60 s; 3 s before the first fetch), at least 1, also in details.retry_after_seconds. 503 WAL_UNAVAILABLE (retriable): the directory did not read, so a directory-mode subject's principal, or a principal's deactivation, is unknown.
Authorization refusals any route gives where it checks a capability or a roster, none retriable. 403 POLICY_DENIED, details.capability and details.denied_by_tier (deployment, tenant, actor or scope): the deployment's or the tenant's policy denies the capability, the token's caps leave it out, a scopes entry names it but not at this scope, or the scope's roster does not admit the caller. Since 0.14.0 a token that carries scopes holds only the capabilities an entry names (: its subtree, ! that one scope, :* every scope and the checks made without one); any other is refused with details.link confinement, and counted instead while CORTEX_TOKEN_CONFINEMENT_ENFORCE=off. An agent chain token (one that carries act or run, or app or client resolving to agent) is confined so whatever the switch, and without scopes holds no capability. A tenant-audience token's :* entry at a scope outside its own org: root is details.link tenant. A token another principal minted (minter a principal other than its sub) also needs that minter to hold the capability under the deployment's and the tenant's policy and the role on the scope's roster: details.link minter, denied_by_tier scope, counted instead while CORTEX_MINTER_LINK_ENFORCE=off. A read whose credential stops being current while it runs (expired or revoked, or its issuers-file entry disabled or reloaded without its audience) is refused 403 POLICY_DENIED before it delivers. 403 APP_NOT_ADMITTED (since 0.14.0): in a tenant whose root sets apps_enforced, a chain whose application (app, or unlisted) is not admitted at the scope. 403 RUN_REQUIRED (since 0.14.0), details.scope: on the write routes (POST /v1/experience, each item of /v1/experience/bulk and /v1/experiences, each JSONL import line, POST /v1/beliefs), a token with act and no run.
The operator key under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS (since 0.14.0, operator_break_glass_v1): allow, audit or deny; unset, deny on the cloud_shared_saas preset and allow on the other presets and with auth disabled; a tenant's own mode (PUT /v1/admin/access/tenant-settings) overrides it in that tenant. 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED, details {mode, class, route}: under deny, without a well-formed X-Cortex-Break-Glass, an operator-key action of class stored_rows (a route that returns stored rows, or a forget or erasure preview whose selector names about_subject, about_entity or predicate), admin_content (a content-returning admin route), private_region (a read whose scope or extra_scopes lie in a private region) or in_band (a mint of a token that carries a data capability, can mint, carries a registry-write capability or is for an Owner of a private region; a registration, an auto-provisioning first write included; a roster or tree edit that widens a private region or adds a service: principal; a write into a private region or a shared org-tree scope; a migration out of a private region; lowering a tenant's mode from deny; a deployment minter's mint of a token that carries a data capability). 400 INVALID_HEADER, in every mode: that header malformed, sent twice or longer than 512 bytes, details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason: what is wrong with it}. Both refusals write the request's audit row as decision deny, each with its denial (check operator_access, path request#x-cortex-break-glass, decided_by_tier request; reason the 403's class, or break_glass_invalid for the 400, which names no scope), within the operator key's bound (its billing tenant and X-Cortex-Actor) (AuditRow). Its form: reason=incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other; ticket=1 to 64 characters of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]; optionally note=percent-encoded UTF-8 of at most 256 bytes; no other key, separated by semicolons. It is read only on the operator key's requests and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens, and ignored on every other credential; a cross-origin browser page cannot send it. 503 NOTICE_UNAVAILABLE: under deny, a header-bearing read of a private region whose notice to the region's person did not commit, so nothing was delivered: details.reason moving, limit, members_behind (Retry-After: 30) or refused (details.refusal), each retriable; arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use, not retriable. A by-id read's notice is its row's region's, committed once the row is read (since 0.14.0; scope_unnamed is gone).
Before authentication, a build that enforces licenses answers every data route 402 LICENSE_EXPIRED, or 402 LICENSE_REQUIRED when it never held a license, not retriable; health, version, ready, /metrics, the published contract (the OpenAPI document, GET /v1/schemas and /v1/schemas/{name}), the console, every GET /v1/admin/* route, GET /v1/auth/whoami, POST /v1/export and, since 0.14.0, deleting data (POST /v1/forget and its preview, POST /v1/erasures and its preview, /v1/erasures/person, /v1/erasures/tenant, /v1/erasures/{id}/cancel, and GET /v1/erasures/{id}, /verify and /receipt) pass. Not an authentication refusal, and answered only where a write needs a newer shard apply format than the node's shard is armed for (change sets, application records, directory and SCIM writes, a person's erasure and a tenant's deletion, writes that carry atoms or provenance, rehomes and watermarks, a declared belief with provenance): 503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING, details {reason, format, node, paths, count} (reason, format and node alone on the directory, SCIM, rehome and watermark writes; reason alone on an application record or a reference root), retriable with Retry-After: 30 for members_behind only (arming_disabled and reserved_path_in_use wait for the operator). A plain node arms for format 10 at its first boot of 0.14.0 under the default ceiling, one way, and then never answers it.
In: header
Path Parameters
The correction, cor_; any other value answers 404 NOT_FOUND.
^cor_[0-9a-f]{32}$Query Parameters
The scope the correction governs (422 INVALID_SCOPE_GRAMMAR when it does not parse); its root routes the request on a cluster.
Header Parameters
operator_break_glass_v1 (API reference §8.15.3): read only on a request the operator key (CORTEX_API_KEY) authenticates, and on a deployment minter's POST /v1/auth/tokens; ignored on every other credential. reason=<incident|legal|support|security|migration|restore|other>; ticket=<1 to 64 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]>[; note=<percent-encoded UTF-8, at most 256 bytes>], exactly one header of at most 512 bytes; any other form is 400 INVALID_HEADER in every mode (details {part: header, field: X-Cortex-Break-Glass, reason}), and the request's audit row a deny. Under CORTEX_OPERATOR_DATA_READS=deny (the deployment's, or the tenant's own) an operator-key request that reads stored rows, a content-returning admin route, a private region's read, or an in-band path needs it, else 403 BREAK_GLASS_REQUIRED (details {mode, class, route}). A well-formed header is written to the audit row as {reason, ticket}, never the note.
length <= 512subject_token_shadow_v1: on a request the operator key authenticates, the token of the principal the operator acts for, verified by the same verifier (without waiting on the network and without the X-Cortex-Actor step) and evaluated in shadow by the access report (GET /v1/admin/access/report). It never changes the response: a repeated, oversized (over 8,192 bytes) or invalid header, or the operator key itself, is recorded as the shadow's invalid_token and the request runs as sent.
length <= 8192Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X DELETE "https://example.com/v1/corrections/string?scope=string"{ "correction_id": "cor_0196f3b0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e02", "state": "undone", "effects": { "facts_restored": 2, "unpinned": true, "replacement_event_erased": true, "events_reextracting": 0, "events_not_queued": 0, "reextract_scan": "complete" }}A correction fixes a memory CortexDB learned, and keeps it fixed. It names a claim (the subject, the field, the value and whether it is negated), never just a fact id, because learning the same event again would mint a new id. You may name the claim directly, or name a fact and the server reads its claim.
Needs capability corrections_v1; experimental. Every route needs data format
11 (503 FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING until then).
Correct, don't forget, a wrong memory
POST /v1/forget with derived_only removes derived rows, but enrichment can learn them again from
the same events. A correction stays applied: no re-enrichment, re-derivation or replay stores the
rejected claim again.
The four actions
| Action | What happens on every replica |
|---|---|
reject | Deletes the facts the correction covers, with their search rows, vectors and the beliefs and concepts built from them, and keeps the claim from being learned again (see Bindings) |
replace | Writes the new value as your own typed triple, closes the old value's facts (still in /v1/facts/timeline), pins the new value and suppresses the old one |
pin | No extracted value replaces the claim. A contradicting extracted value stays beside it, and each such contest opens a conflict. A typed triple, and a replacement, still replace it |
confirm | Marks the value as supported: a belief whose claim it is reads supported, not contradicted. It blocks nothing |
curl -sS -X POST "$CORTEX_URL/v1/corrections" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEX_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "idempotency_key": "bob-fix-17",
"action": "reject", "target": {"fact_id": "fact_0196a1b2c3d47e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b"},
"bind": "claim", "reason": "I never lived in Boston"}'curl -sS -X POST "$CORTEX_URL/v1/corrections" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEX_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob", "idempotency_key": "bob-fix-18",
"action": "replace",
"target": {"claim": {"subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Boston"}},
"value": {"object": "Denver", "valid_from": "2026-03-01"}}'{"correction_id": "cor_0196f3b0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e02", "action": "replace",
"scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob",
"claim": {"subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Boston"},
"replacement": {"event_id": "evt_0196f3b0…", "fact_id": "fact_0196f3b0…",
"claim": {"subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Denver"}},
"effects": {"facts_deleted": 0, "facts_closed": 1, "pinned": true, "suppressed_sources": 1},
"state": "applied", "record_kept": true, "consistency_token": "ct1.eyJyIjoib3JnOmFjbWUifQ"}Who may correct: a Writer of the scope with scope.write, so an end user's own token can correct
what is known about them. A correction covers the facts at its scope and below it.
| Field | Notes |
|---|---|
scope | Required. The scope the correction governs |
action | Required: reject, replace, pin or confirm |
target | Required: exactly one of fact_id and claim ({subject, predicate, object, negated?}; an empty predicate names a sentence fact) |
bind | A rejection's reach: claim (default), subject_predicate or subject |
value | Required for replace: {object, valid_from?} |
valid | A confirmation's window, {from?, to?} |
reason | Optional, at most 512 bytes; erased with the correction |
subject_principal | Optional: the person the claim is about (user:bob), so their erasure erases the correction |
idempotency_key | Optional: a retry with the same key answers the first attempt (replayed: true) |
Bindings
A rejection's bind decides what it keeps from being learned again:
claim(default): this claim, from the events the correction cites and every event captured before it. A later statement is new evidence, and is learned.subject_predicate: every value of this field for this subject, past and future.subject: everything about the subject ("never remember this about me").
Rejecting a typed triple you wrote yourself erases its event, because no suppression can stop your
own statement. The answer counts the events erased and names the erasure job (effects.erasure_id),
whose receipt you can read. When that erasure took every event the correction would cite, nothing is
left to keep (record_kept: false): the trail is the audit row and the erasure's receipt.
What a correction cannot do
- A
replacecloses the values extraction made, never a value your own typed triple stated. Your replacement supersedes such a value only as any later typed triple would: on a single-valued field, and when itsvalid_fromis not earlier. On a multi-valued field, reject the old statement instead. - A sentence fact is matched by its text, so a paraphrase of a rejected sentence can come back. Bind
subject_predicate, or replace the value with a typed triple. - An event captured before a rejection and not yet learned from can state the claim again once every event the correction cites is erased (which erases the correction).
Undo
DELETE /v1/corrections/{id}?scope=… undoes a correction: a replacement's triple is erased, what the
correction deleted comes back (unless another correction covers it or its events are gone), what it
closed reopens, and its pin goes. The author, an Owner of the scope, or the operator may undo; anyone
else is answered 404.
{"correction_id": "cor_0196f3b0c1d27b3e9a4f5d6c7b8a9e02", "state": "undone",
"effects": {"facts_restored": 1, "unpinned": true, "replacement_event_erased": true,
"events_reextracting": 0, "events_not_queued": 0, "reextract_scan": "complete"}}An undo also brings back what a rejection kept from being learned in the first place: it queues the
events whose candidates the correction dropped for extraction again, under the daily extraction
budget (effects.events_reextracting). One undo queues at most 20,000 events; a
re-extraction reaches the rest.
List and read
GET /v1/corrections?scope=… lists the corrections governing exactly a scope, filterable by action,
origin (user, review, regate, …), subject and predicate. GET /v1/corrections/{id}?scope=…
reads one, with the facts it changed as they were. A correction is served to a reader of its scope
who may read the events it cites.
{"items": [{"correction_id": "cor_0196f3b0…", "action": "reject", "bind": "claim",
"scope": "org:acme/app:companion/user:bob",
"claim": {"subject": "user", "predicate": "lives_in", "object": "Boston"},
"origin": "user", "by": "user:bob", "at": "2026-11-07T10:02:11Z",
"reason": "I never lived in Boston", "sources": 3, "sources_remaining": 3, "state": "active"}],
"next_cursor": null, "has_more": false}Facts read with include=derivation say whether a correction pins or confirms them (pinned,
confirmed). Resolving a conflict records its outcome as
corrections too, and answers their correction_ids.
Erasure and audit
A correction cites the source events of the facts it changed. Erasing one of several keeps it;
erasing the last erases it, and the erasure's receipt lists it. A scope erasure, the erasure of its
subject_principal, an undo, or the tenant's deletion erase it too. A subject_predicate or
subject rejection cites no events: it goes with its scope, by undo, or with the tenant.
Every correction writes an audit row (action: "correction"), and every undo another
(correction_undo), holding a hash of the answer, never its words.
Errors
| HTTP | Code | When |
|---|---|---|
| 409 | CORRECTION_CONFLICT | An open correction of the same claim and action, or a pin and a rejection of one claim (details.existing) |
| 409 | WRITER_NOT_ALLOWED | A replace of a field whose writer rules leave out correction |
| 409 | IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT | The same key with another body |
| 409 | PROVENANCE_ERASED | An event it cites was erased while it ran |
| 422 | CORRECTION_TARGET_UNKNOWN | No live fact in the scope states the claim (details.claim). A replace of an unknown claim is a plain write |
| 404 | NOT_FOUND | A fact_id that does not exist under the scope, or that you may not read |
| 503 | FORMAT_UPGRADE_PENDING | The server is held at data format 10 |
Derivation Policies
Typed rules for what CortexDB's enrichment may learn under a scope — staged through change sets, tested on real events, layered down the scope tree, with subject settings, templates and a sensitive-topic taxonomy.
Review
Hold candidate memories for a person or a service to approve before CortexDB stores them — the review queue and its decisions.